31. März 1999

Diese Dokument in deutsch.

Dr. Gerald MADER

An assessment of the war between NATO vs. Yugoslavia from a peace policy point of view

A statement from the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)

March 31, 1999

Content:

1. A conflict in the making
2. From breakdown of peace negotiations to failure of NATO strategy
3. The failure of NATO crisis management
4. The war in view of international law
5. What can be done?
6. What contribution can Austria impart?

1. A conflict in the making

With the abolishing of Kosovo as an autonomous province (1989), Slobodan Milosovic launched a policy which subscribed to a serbo nationalist agenda leading to the suppression of the albanian majority by the serbian minority.  Initially the Albanian reacted with non violence.  However, only after realizing that western support, for its cause, was not forthcoming, emerged the KLA and resorted to arms and violence.  The Serbs retaliated, by use of their police and military apparatus, with brutal repression of the Albanians.  As a result, killings and a wave of flight ensued, which were not instrumentalized and carried out solely by Serbs, and thus brought forth a further escalation of violence.

Milosevic finally consented to the stationing of OSCE monitors, in the Kosovo, when the USA, Russia, EU and NATO as well as the OSCE were implicated in the conflict.  He refused to give his consent to the Rambouillet, accords, which were developed by representatives from the EU, USA and Russia, as it entailed the stationing of NATO troops in Kosovo.  Consequently, OSCE monitoring personnel as well as international aid organizations withdrew from the region and NATO issued a bombing order, which it had repeatedly threatened to execute throughout the period of negotiations.  The officially declared goals of the military offensive were to force Milosovic to sign the peace accord as well as to prevent a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.  However, the bombardments during the first week of the assault could neither force Milosevic to back down nor prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.  On the contrary, the bombardments have:

• reinforced the differences between the warring fractions;
• strengthened the militarists;
• weakened democratic opposition in Serbia;
• aggravated the condition of innocent civil population;
• impaired the role of the United Nations and the conflict resolving mechanism of international as well as national institutions;
• led to deterioration of relations between NATO members and Russia, with potential negative consequences for European integration.

2. From breakdown of peace negotiations to failure of NATO strategy

The failure of peace negotiations in Rambouillet has to be viewed in context of strategic aims of the US and NATO.

NATO's strategic aim was not the extension and support of the OSCE mission in Kosovo, but the stationing of NATO troops in the Kosovo in order to legitimatize as well as make a name for itself as being the sole body capable of delivering peace in a new world order dominated by NATO.  Moreover, it should enforce and document NATO's final transformation from a defensive alliance to a coalition which is guided by principles of intervention in an "out of area" context and driven by geopolitical interests in Europe, on the Balkan, in the Near East, and the whole of Eurasia.

According to NATO's new strategy the peace accord, which was put to the warring parties, included a political as well as military component.  The political constituent envisioned the Albanians, whose sole aim is independence, to only receive autonomous status within Yugoslavia, whereas the military element foresaw the Serbs to accept the stationing of NATO troops in the Kosovo.

After intensive pressuring and assurances the Albanians signed the accord of Rambouillet.  It was attempted to force the Serbs, through repeated NATO bombing threats, to sign, particularly, the military stipulation of the peace accord.  However, especially these proclaimed threats of bombardments turned out to be disadvantageous for NATO, as it created an impasse, a "cul de sac, " which gave it no option other than to bomb in case the threats fail.  Moreover, it provided the opportunity for Serbian leadership, after realizing the inevitability of bombardments, to anticipate the bombings and plan the expulsion of the Albanian population.

During the course of NATO bombing the Serbian leadership directed and implemented, against the Albanians, an offensive policy of repression and expulsion, which denoted the ultimate catastrophe for the Albanian people.  NATO legitimized its strategy of bombing and  engaging in an offensive war by contending to be morally justified to do so and therefore prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe.  Presently this strategy appears to be debatable as the bombardments did not put a halt on expulsions, but in fact led to a dramatic increase of violence, capriciousness and displacement of people.  Even if one agrees with the notion that Milosovic already had plans, prior to the bombings, to expulse the Albanians, it was only the departure of the OSCE monitoring personnel as well as the bombardment of Yugoslavia which created the pre-conditions, to implement and follow through a policy of brutality, by excluding the general public.  Milosovic has nothing to lose, he can only win, even he faces a military defeat, which will further the myth of being the new Serbian hero of Kosova. 

3. The failure of NATO crisis management

NATO has maneuvered itself into a unsolvable dilemma, as it seemingly had incorrectly assessed the overall situation as well as the response of Milosovic.  Furthermore, it overestimated the effects of its bombing threats and failed to develop any worst case scenarios.  It may have felt additional pressure to perform as the 50 year anniversary festivities of NATO are approaching and did not want to be perceived as a mere paper tiger, but a messenger of peace.  The possible loss of prestige, the believe in the rigthtesnous of its actions, as well as Milosovic un -succumbing position, left NATO with no other option, but having to fulfill its so often publicly announced pledge of bombing.  Indeed, being aware of the high stakes involved when launching an attack without an UN-mandate and having learned the lessons of history, that external attacks only strengthen the power of dictators, these bombardments actually suited the aims and goals of Milosovic.  That is why arguments, such as the attacks are solely directed against Milosovic and not the Serbs, find little understanding with the Serbian people.  They are suffering from the bombardments, without having been informed about the atrocities taking place in Kosova.

It is incomprehensible, that the most mighty military power in the world, which legitimizes and justifies its existence by drawing upon abstract worst case scenarios, has not prepared any concrete plans, which outline such alternatives.  In other words, no plans had been made in  case Milosovic would not consent to the stationing of NATO troops and in the event that he refuses to add his signature to an accord, after being bombed,which has meanwhile become obsolete.

The fact of the matter is that NATO's crisis management has failed, causing harm to the Albanian people, but also damaging NATO's political credibility of being a crisis manager.  NATO declares that it wants to export to the east, peace, stability and prosperity. Apart from the gigantic sums of money which are senselessly wasted, the bombing of Yugoslavia illustrates that it is easier to destroy a country then establish peace.

The failure of NATO's crisis management is also tied to basic NATO strategy, which conceives of securing global peace by pursuing a policy of military prevention, which rests on an all powerful defense industry and the military.

4. The war in view of international law

NATO's attack on Yugoslavia offends international law and the UN charter, as NATO is lacking the mandate of the security council, which is the sole body warranted to legitimate attacks on sovereign nations.  Divergent and selective interpretation of international are interest based and products of individual opinions.  The resulting consequences of such actions might lead to an abolishment of the UNO.

The alternative to the UNO is the anarchy of states, characterized by the rule of power.  It is to the credit of the USA, that the UNO was brought to life.  With the creation of the UNO the US has accomplished a tremendous and lasting deed for global peace.  If US policy aims to replace, step by step, the UNO with NATO, then this process of UNO dismantling has to be viewed as a fundamental breach of international law and contrary to original US policy.

Not the weakening or abolishment of the UNO, but its reform has to be the goal.  This reform has to be held accountable to the development of international law, which considers human rights not part of the internal affaires of a state.  Interventions in favor of human rights are important and take place often.  However, the protection of human rights, is also subordinated to the use of non-violence as set forth by the UNO.  Rightly so, as war represents the greatest offence of human rights.  The example of Kosovo illustrates that warfare, as a rule, does not improve the lot of those who suffer from human rights abuses, but in fact worsens their plight.

5. What can be done ?

Three major areas have to be immediately and simultaneously, independent of progress in individual spheres, addressed.

• An immediate cease fire for all war, police and terror activities, has to be agreed upon.  A pre-condition for the humanization of living conditions.
• Help should be given especially to refugees and displaced persons, who have been affected by the war.
• To prevent military escalation, the regions of Macedonia and Albania, where war has not yet spread, should be given extensive political and economic aid.

The consent of the warring parties is required to ensure a cease fire agreement.  Such an approval can only be reached, if the conflicting parties accept each other as negotiating partners or if one conflict party has the overall advantage and means of power to dictate a cease fire.  None of these two options are likely to occur in the near future.  It is for this reason, that mediators, who have up to now not been involved, such as the UNO, the OSCE or Russia have to be drawn in.  The UNO would be the most suitable agent to take charge as it is the only organization which has a global mandate for peace keeping and potentially could also play a vital role once a cease-fire agreement is secured. 

For establishing a cease fire and humanizing living condition in the region, an international peace keeping mission is required.  These endeavors could be integrated with the already existing UNO missions in Macedonia and the OSCE mission in Kosovo.  A mandate of such a mission could entail:

• Political aim:  Negotiations between the warring parties, with the goal of overall autonomy for the Albanians (possibly as a 3. Republic, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for the Kosovo Albanians. 
• Military aim: the demilitarization of the conflict parties and the protection of civil population and civilian mission members as well as other international aid workers.
• Civil aim:  the protection of civil population through international police.  Supporting the return and integration of refugees and displaced persons as well as initiating efforts of reconciliation.  This also includes the setting up of political and legal structures as well as the raising of an indigenous police force, which is ethnically diverse, and the protection of human rights as well as providing aid for reconstruction.

Besides a peace keeping mission, the commitment of a large number of non governmental organizations is called for in order to act as neutral mediators and supporting to bridge the deep rooted conflicts between ethnic groups.

Independent of the successful outcome of establishing a cease-fire, immediate aid must be given to refugees.  Extensive political as well as economic programs of support have to be granted to Macedonia and Albania, which are still not at war.  All of these measures will prevent subsequent military escalation and reduce further victims and material destruction. The implementation of these measures will impede the rise of otherwise unforeseen consequences, which may have repercussions for Europe and the rest of the world. A package of economic aid covering the entire conflict region could be coupled with an ERP-Program, which calls for and gives consideration to an "Agenda for the socio-economic reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe", as proposed in a ÖAW study titled "Der Markt Schock."

No progress can be anticipated without facilitating a public discourse addressing the above described measures.  Especially, small nations such as Austria are called upon to actively partake. 

6. What contribution can Austria impart?

It is noble that Austria is acting according to its constitution (neutrality act) and is not taking part in NATO's military offensive in Yugoslavia as well as not granting permission for NATO to cross its air space with bomb carrying planes.  The resulting pressure which NATO exerts on Austria gives only a hint of what type of pressure Austria would be exposed to if it were an actual NATO member.

As a small and neutral country, Austria could enhance initiatives such as those described above.

Translated by Rashid Doole, Program Co-ordinator at the EPU