WELCOME TO IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 37, 25 May 1999

THE LAST WAR BEGINS. While opposition figures gather in Montenegro, the Yugoslav Army is putting the second Yugoslav republic under increasing pressure. Zeljko Ivanovic in Podgorica reports.

SEEDS OF DISCONTENT. While many families have been left without an income, harvests are at risk and some local authorities are breaking ranks with Belgrade to impose war-time rationing. A journalist in Novi Sad reports.

WOBBLING TOWARDS A GROUND WAR. Clinton may still just say no, but NATO seems to be edging towards ground troops in an "unpermissive" environment. Ian Williams in New York reports.

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Editor: Anthony Borden. Assistant Editing: Christopher Bennett, Alan Davis. Internet Editor: Rohan Jayasekera. Translation by Alban Mitrushi.
"Balkan Crisis Report" is produced under IWPR's Balkan Crisis Information Project. The project seeks to contribute to regional and international understanding of the regional crisis and prospects for resolution.
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THE LAST WAR BEGINS

While opposition figures gather in Montenegro, the Yugoslav Army is putting the second Yugoslav republic under increasing pressure.

By Zeljko Ivanovic in Podgorica

Montenegro feels on the eve of war--army checkpoints and machine-gun nests punctuate the countryside, the borders are closed, and armed men break into flats to press gang men of military age, leading them away in handcuffs.

The situation is so tense that several independent journalists--including Nebojsa Redzic, editor of Radio Free Montenegro, and Milodrag Perovic, editor of the independent publication Monitor--have fled abroad. Foreign journalists and aid workers are being systematically harassed by Yugoslav soldiers. Every day the army appears to be extending the area of its activity, while the Podgorica authorities find their room for manoeuvre increasingly limited.

"It is obvious that [the generals] have tied their destiny to [Yugoslav President Slobodan] Milosevic," asserts Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic. "They are here not to save Montenegro but to implement the plans of an authoritarian regime."

The increasingly blunt language used by Djukanovic and others in Montenegro, Serbia's junior partner in the Yugoslav federation, illustrates both their desire to raise an international warning and a recognition that attempts to placate Belgrade and avoid conflict have failed.

Djukanovic argues that, when the crisis is over, "Somebody will be held responsible for the kidnapping, the plunder of humanitarian aid, the theft of property and money, and the economic blockade of Montenegro."

Clearly he is referring to the current leadership in Belgrade, on the assumption that it will be defeated. Otherwise, Montenegro's position within the federation will be in question. "If Milosevic remains in power, Yugoslavia has no prospects even after the war is over," he says.

Other leading politicians have argued that the republic must reconsider its relationship to Serbia whoever rules Belgrade. "Montenegro no longer wants to fear the possible abuse of the Constitution, whether it comes from Milosevic or somebody else," says Dragan Soc, Montenegrin Justice Minister.

He promises to use this week's Balkan conference in Bonn as a forum to seek "guarantees which would enable this republic to make all decisions independently."

Leading Belgrade opposition figure Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party agrees that Montenegro cannot be held hostage to its larger federation partner. "Montenegro must have as its goal a fast entrance to Europe," he said, in an interview in the recent issue of the independent Montenegrin publication Monitor. "Should Serbia be a big obstacle to the realisation of that goal, then I am sorry, but it has to be jumped over."

Yet as Djukanovic, his ministers and fellow opposition figures have taken an increasingly aggressive stance, Belgrade has sought to demonise all opposition and blame them for the country's troubles.

A recent issue of the Belgrade daily Politika devoted an entire page to Djukanovic, Djindjic, and the opposition leaders Vesna Pesic and Vuk Obradovic, branding them "new Brankovics"--a notorious Serbian traitor--for trying to impose "tomahawk democracy". The paper demanded their arrests.

Such public denunciations have lead Djindjic's Democratic Party, whose headquarters in Belgrade have been attacked, to argue that "Milosevic is beginning his last war--the civil war in Serbia."

The increasingly close ties between Djukanovic and Djindjic may be built on a common wish to democratise Yugoslavia, but they are also based on common fear: the former over war in Montenegro, and the latter over his and his colleagues' personal security

As diplomats discuss possible settlements to end NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, both leaders are concerned that any kind of compromise satisfactory to Milosevic would merely herald further conflict. They fear that Belgrade will settle scores with its internal opposition and, in particular, Montenegro.

Even if foreign troops sent to Kosovo might make it difficult for Milosevic to wage a new war, he could use the several week gap between a peace agreement and their deployment to meet out retribution.

"The state of neither war nor peace can be dangerous," warns Podgorica political scientist Sasa Burzanovic. "Milosevic must resolve the issue of opposition before foreign troops march in, by attempting to eliminate it."

Zeljko Ivanovic is founder and director of Vijesti, the only independent daily newspaper in Montenegro.

SEEDS OF DISCONTENT

While many families have been left without an income, harvests are at risk and some local authorities are breaking ranks with Belgrade to impose war-time rationing.

By a journalist in Novi Sad

After two months of NATO bombing, the daily struggle of most Serbs to put food on the table has become so severe even the regime media has had to acknowledge it.

A recent issue of the Belgrade daily Glas Javnosti focused on the fortunes of the Petrovic family from Lenin Boulevard in New Belgrade. Although all four members work--the father is an engineer, the mother a teacher, and the two children combine studies with menial jobs--they are forced to borrow money towards the end of every month just to meet their food bill.

If the Petrovic's--with their four pay packets--are struggling to make ends meet, conditions for the bulk of the population are even more difficult. The average monthly income for those in work is about 1,000 dinars (100 German Marks), and many families are without a single breadwinner.

With no sign of an early end to NATO's air campaign, many analysts fear that conditions will deteriorate in the coming months to such an extent that hunger could effect vulnerable sections of Serbian society by late autumn.

In an effort to head off food supply problems, authorities in Nis, Serbia's third city, and elsewhere, have introduced rationing--moves which Belgrade deems unnecessary.

"The decision of some towns in Serbia concerning the provision of foodstuffs by means of coupons is illegal and their withdrawal has been ordered," says Serbian Trade Minister Zoran Krstic.

He claims that food supplies are much as before the war and that shortages of sugar, cooking oil, rice and other basic commodities are temporary, caused by unnecessary hoarding.

Whatever the case, shops in much of the country now lack many essential products and the black market is thriving. Moreover, the availability of food will worsen if this year's harvest is poor.

Publicly, government officials remain optimistic. Vojvodina Prime Minister Bosko Perosevic boasts that 97 per cent of arable land in his province, Yugoslavia's breadbasket which produces between 80 and 90 per cent of the country's agricultural products, has been successfully sowed "despite NATO aggression".

"Yields of wheat will reach roughly the same level as the average in recent years," he says. "And the barley yield is expected to be greater than in previous years." With equal optimism, Perosevic also forecasts good harvests for corn, sunflower and sugar beat.

Federal Agriculture Minister Nedeljko Sipovac goes further, insisting, "We have a sure and secured supply for citizens of food, meat, milk and their products, as well as a surplus of these products for export."

Agricultural experts do not share the politicians' optimism. They fear catastrophically low yields in Vojvodina's farms this year. If their prognoses prove accurate, this could seriously threaten the supply of food for the Serbian market.

Even before the NATO bombing campaign, Milorad Rajic, a leading farming expert, had warned that this year's harvest would be poor because of poor preparations for the spring sowing. He says that farmers failed to plough their fields properly in the winter, did not have sufficient money to buy seeds, were unable to acquire sufficient fuel and artificial fertilisers, and did not have adequate machinery and spare parts.

Although Vojvodina's soil is exceptionally fertile, lack of investment during the past decade has caused yields to fall. The average age of tractors, combine harvesters and other farming machines is more than 15 years. Many are no longer operational and only kept for spare parts. Most farmers are so impoverished that they cannot afford to buy necessary parts, let alone new machines.

As a result, Vojvodina now generates just three-and-a-half tonnes of wheat per hectare, compared with more than five tonnes in Hungary, seven in the United Kingdom and eight in the Netherlands.

Ljiljana Vasic, president of the Alliance of Co-operatives of Vojvodina, said on the eve of the sowing that she fears that Serbia will soon have to import not only sugar and cooking oil, but also wheat and corn. She warned that yields of agricultural products in Vojvodina have dropped to 1965 levels.

Since the NATO bombing, farmers have required coupons for fuel. In April, they were entitled to 8 litres of fuel for each hectare; in May only 4 litres. They say that with so little fuel they can hardly reach their farms, let alone work on them.

Wheat harvesting should begin in about a month's time. However, without an end to the war and additional fuel supplies, much of the wheat will likely stay in the fields and rot. Even if conditions do improve and there is a peace agreement, there are not enough working combine harvesters to complete the harvest.

Transporting agricultural products from farms to storage silos and processing plants will also be difficult. In addition to the fuel shortage, farmers have to contend with the destruction to Serbia's infrastructure, damage inflicted on roads, and especially the bridges across the Danube linking Vojvodina with the rest of the country.

Paying for the agricultural products will be a particular problem. The state has failed to pay farmers what it owes them for last year's produce. As a result of the war, this situation can only get worse.

Farmers fear that the state will seize their produce by force just as the communists did that after the Second World War via "obligatory purchases". As evidence, they point to restrictions, which the state has just imposed, on the quantity of wheat that farmers can mill for their own needs. The implication is that any surplus will have to be handed over to the state.

The author is an independent journalist in Novi Sad whose name has been withheld.

WOBBLING TOWARDS A GROUND WAR

Clinton may still just say no, but NATO seems to be edging towards ground troops in an "unpermissive" environment.

By Ian Williams in New York

Improvisation reigns in the Kosovo peace process.

Touring Macedonia recently, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan predicted that the UN would have a "central role" in resolving the Kosovo crisis. In truth it may be little more than a cameo, with the script and direction from elsewhere.

Yet the real directors of the drama, the G8, the Security Council and the US, are by turns divided and confused, ensuring that any solution will be an ad-hoc affair, with much haggling over the degree of the Serbian withdrawal, and the size, composition and control of the international force.

That is, if an invasion doesn't happen first.

Even hard-line UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has talked about the feasibility of a handful of Serbian troops to keep the Yugoslav flag flying. Reports from Bonn suggest that this could mean 5,000, halving after one year. They would "protect" the holy sites--the Orthodox churches and monasteries that the Serbs claim substantiate their occupation of Kosovo.

The international force agreement is more difficult. The Russians are unhappy with a replay of the Dayton agreement for the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, which enshrines NATO command and control while allowing Russian "association".

KFOR would almost certainly operate under a UN mandate, and would have NATO, Russian and non-NATO components. However if, as suggested, the Russians were to take the zone in the north of the province, it could be a step towards Dayton II--a de facto partition of the province, leaving the richest part in Serb hands. It would remain Albanian-free since few Kosovars would care to rely on Moscow's protection.

With so much left unresolved, it is hardly surprising that the G8 talks ended last Friday, May 23, with few signs of progress. Despite moments of optimism, UN diplomats were not racing to the Security Council to pass a resolution. They cautioned that it could be weeks before any type of agreed text is ready, and even then, confusion at the G8 could leave open much room for argument.

Meantime, China still declares its refusal to countenance any UN resolution until the bombing stops, although somewhat less fervently as the World Trade Organisation talks loom and the patriotic fervour of the embassy bombing ebbs.

Yet the question remains, What purpose would a Security Council resolution serve? NATO wants it to legitimise its actions, get the Russians on side, and give the Serbs a ladder to climb down gracefully.

Belgrade wants to move decision-making to a forum where it can count on Chinese and Russian vetoes to improve any deal. As Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister Nebosja Vujovic told reporters in Belgrade on Friday, "Read my lips. It's not about NATO. It's about the UN."

But the Yugoslavs may not get a free-ride there. Annan may follow the orders of the Security Council, but he has resisted vociferously pacifist calls by some of his staff to condemn the NATO bombing. While expressing a pious hope for Security Council involvement, he stressed that military action may be necessary when diplomacy fails.

Other UN members who supported the fifty-plus previous resolutions condemning Milosevic's regime may also be less eager than Moscow to give Belgrade any solution too disadvantageous to the Kosovo Albanians.

In Washington, Senator John McCain's bilaterally supported resolution pre-authorising the US of ground troops was defeated in the Senate by a three to one majority. The forces ranged against it included the White House, determined to silence all poll-disturbing mention of ground troops, and Republicans, equally determined to make sure that if the President does have to ask for authorisation, he will suffer the maximum political damage for it.

It was in this spirit that Congress passed the special emergency authorisation bill. They took the $6 billion Pentagon appropriation that the president had asked to cover the war's costs, and doubled it by adding lots of extra money for the military. Clinton knows all too well that the same opponents who are proving so uncooperative about pressuring Milosevic will join members of his own party in savaging him if any deal looks like a sell out of the Kosovo Albanians.

Adding to his problems, the visit of Robin Cook, and reported phone calls between UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Clinton have, despite public disavowals of a split, reinforced the call for ground troops. A steady stream of leaks from the military suggest the same. For the White House, perhaps more potent than any strategic military necessity is the rising popularity of McCain as a presidential candidate.

The current Clintonian response is to prepare a NATO force of 50,000 on the borders of Kosovo, including a contingent of 7,000 US troops. This will, officially, not be a commitment to an opposed invasion but merely preparation for an agreed entry to support the return of the Kosovo Albanian refugees.

But the message may get across to Belgrade. Unless Milosevic offers a way out, the notoriously indecisive Clinton seems to be wobbling towards a ground war, with or without UN approval. Ian Williams, UN correspondent for The Nation magazine and author of the book United Nations for Beginners, was for many years US editor of the IWPR magazine WarReport.

IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 37